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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO, )
) NO. 45072
Plaintiff-Respondent, )
) ADA COUNTY NO. CR01-16-29915
v. )
)




STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Jeremy John Lopez appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 35 (“Rule 35”) for a reduction of sentence.  He contends the district court
abused its discretion when it sentenced him to a unified term of eight years, with two years fixed,
for grand theft by possession of stolen property.  He also contends the district court abused its
discretion when it denied his Rule 35 motion in light of the additional information he submitted
to the court regarding the strong potential for him to lose his parental rights to his youngest child
while incarcerated.
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Statement of Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Lopez was found to be in possession of a stolen vehicle.  (Presentence Investigation
Report (“PSI”), p.3.)  He was charged by Information with grand theft by possession of stolen
property.  (R., pp.37-38.)  Mr. Lopez entered into a plea agreement with the State pursuant to
which he agreed to plead guilty, and the State agreed to dismiss another felony case, not file an
Information Part II, and recommend a unified sentence of ten years, with three years fixed.
(12/7/16 Tr., p.1, L.12 – p.2, L.7; R., pp.61-67.)  The district court accepted Mr. Lopez’s guilty
plea.  (12/7/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.15-18.)
The district court sentenced Mr. Lopez to a unified term of eight years, with two years
fixed.  (2/15/17 Tr., p.18, Ls.13-17.)  The judgment of conviction was filed on February 17,
2017.  (R., pp.71-74.)  Mr. Lopez filed a Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence on
February 28, 2017.  (R., pp.75-84.)  Following a hearing, the district court issued a memorandum
decision and order denying Mr. Lopez’s Rule 35 motion on April 28, 2017.  (R., pp.88-91.)
Mr. Lopez filed a timely notice of appeal on May 1, 2017.  (R., pp.92-94.)
ISSUES
I. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Lopez to a unified term
of eight years, with two years fixed?




The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Sentenced Mr. Lopez To A Unified Term Of
Eight Years, With Two Years Fixed
Mr. Lopez asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of eight years,
with two years fixed, was excessive.  Where, as here, the sentence imposed by the district court
is within statutory limits, “the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse
of discretion.” State v. Miller, 151 Idaho 828, 834 (2011) (quoting State v. Windom, 150 Idaho
873, 875 (2011)).  “When a trial court exercises its discretion in sentencing, ‘the most
fundamental requirement is reasonableness.’” Id. (quoting State v. Hooper, 119 Idaho 606, 608
(1991)).  “A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of
protecting society and to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation or
retribution.” Id. (citation omitted).  “When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court
will make an independent examination of the record, ‘having regard to the nature of the offense,
the character of the offender and the protection of the public interest.’” Id. (quoting State v.
Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982)).
The sentence imposed upon Mr. Lopez was not reasonable considering, most importantly,
the nature of his offense.  Mr. Lopez was convicted of grand theft by possession of stolen
property,  after  he  was  found  to  be  possession  of  a  vehicle  that  had  been  stolen  from  an  older
woman, who had left the car running outside of her garage while packing for a trip with her
elderly mother.  (PSI, p.3.)  The victim is incredibly sympathetic, and the circumstances of the
theft are disheartening.  (PSI, p.3.)  But Mr. Lopez did not steal the car, and there is no indication
he was involved in planning the car theft, or knew anything about the theft until long after it had
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occurred.  At the change of plea hearing, Mr. Lopez described the circumstances of his offense
as follows:
My car broke down so a friend of mine came over, and I asked if I could use the
car  he  was  driving.   And  he  told  me  that  they  had  no  license  plates  on  it,  so  I
assumed right then that something was shifty with it.  So I took the license plates
and put them on the car and I took my stuff up to his house.
(12/7/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.10-17.)  Mr. Lopez testified he had the stolen vehicle for “[a]bout an hour”
and intended to return it to his friend “in a couple hours.”  (12/7/16 Tr., p.14, Ls.22-23, p.15,
Ls.12-15.)  Mr. Lopez apologized to the district court and the victim at sentencing, stating he
never intended for anything to be taken from her.  (2/15/17 Tr., p.13, Ls.4-8.)  While Mr. Lopez
suspected there was “something . . . shifty” about the vehicle, his crime of borrowing a stolen car
from his friend did not warrant a term of incarceration.
Mr. Lopez’s sentence was also not justified by his character or a need to protect the
public interest.  Mr. Lopez earned his GED from Boise State University and had been employed
as  a  laborer  prior  to  the  instant  offense.   (PSI,  pp.16-17.)   Mr.  Lopez  was,  by  all  accounts,  a
loving and committed father.  The foster parent of his youngest daughter submitted to the district
court a very positive letter attesting to Mr. Lopez’s character and requesting a lenient sentence.
(PSI, pp.241-42.)  Counsel for Mr. Lopez told the district court Mr. Lopez’s “primary focus and
goal has been . . . his children.”  (2/15/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.6-8.)  Mr. Lopez has a lengthy criminal
history, and has struggled with drug addiction, but neither his criminal history nor his substance
abuse warrant the sentence imposed.  (PSI, pp.12-13, 31.)
The presentence investigator stated Mr. Lopez “may benefit from participation in Drug
Court, as he may gain the life skills and support resources to assist him in maintaining his
sobriety and expanding his positive support system.”  (PSI, pp.22-23.)  Mr. Lopez asked the
district court to place him in drug court and said, “I won’t let you down.”  (2/15/17 Tr., p.14,
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Ls.7-8.)  The presentence investigator stated if the district court found that drug court was not
appropriate, Mr. Lopez “may be a viable candidate for an order of retained jurisdiction.”  (PSI,
p.23.)  The district court did not place Mr. Lopez on probation or retain jurisdiction, despite the
presentence investigator’s recommendation, but instead imposed a lengthy term of incarceration.
In light of the mitigating factors that exist in this case, and notwithstanding the
aggravating factors, the district court abused its discretion when it sentenced Mr. Lopez to a
unified term of eight years, with two years fixed.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Lopez’s Rule 35 Motion
“A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the sound
discretion of the sentencing court . . . and essentially is a plea for leniency which may be granted
if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe.” State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253
(Ct. App. 1994).  “The denial of a motion for modification of a sentence will not be disturbed
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” Id.  In examining a district court’s denial
of a motion for modification, this Court “examine[s] the probable duration of confinement in
light of the nature of the crime, the character of the offender and the objectives of sentencing,
which are the protection of society, deterrence, rehabilitation and retribution.” Id. “If the
sentence was not excessive when pronounced, the defendant must later show that it is excessive
in view of new or additional information presented with the motion for reduction.” Id.
The district court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Lopez’s Rule 35 motion
because Mr. Lopez provided additional information to the district court regarding the strong
potential for him to lose his parental rights to his youngest child while incarcerated.  In support
of  his  Rule  35  motion,  Mr.  Lopez  told  the  district  court  his  three-year-old  daughter,  J.B.,  was
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going to be put up for adoption if he was not released.  (R., pp.76-82, PSI, p.16.)  At the hearing
on his Rule 35 motion, Mr. Lopez called Karen Allen,  a social  worker with the State of Idaho
who had worked with Mr. Lopez for two years.  (4/26/17 Tr., p.6, L.14 – p.7, L.25.)  Ms. Allen
testified Mr. Lopez had made great progress on reuniting with his daughter, and his daughter was
living with him on an “extended home visit” prior to his incarceration on the instant offense.
(4/26/17 Tr., p.9, L.17 – p.10, L.18.)  She testified Mr. Lopez was a “very present parent” and
stated he and his kids “just melt into each other.”  (4/26/17 Tr., p.11, Ls.5-13.)  Ms. Allen was
asked what would happen if Mr. Lopez remains in custody for two years, and she answered,
“[W]e are actually going to have to petition to terminate his parental rights.”  (4/26/17 Tr., p.11,
L.24 – p.12, L.2.)
In  light  of  the  strong,  demonstrated  potential  for  Mr.  Lopez  to  lose  custody  of  his
youngest child, counsel for Mr. Lopez asked the district court to either suspend Mr. Lopez’s
sentence and place him on probation, or reduce the fixed portion of his sentence “so that he can
get out and be reunified with his daughter.”  (4/26/17 Tr., p.16, Ls.9-12.)  The district court
judge, notably not the same judge who presided over Mr. Lopez’s sentencing, denied
Mr. Lopez’s motion in a brief written decision, stating simply that there was insufficient
evidence to support a finding that the sentence was unduly severe when originally imposed.
(R., pp.89-90.)  On the evidence presented, this decision represents an abuse of discretion.  The
sentence  imposed  on  Mr.  Lopez  is  not  warranted  by  the  statutory  sentencing  factors,  and  will
most  likely  result  in  Mr.  Lopez  losing  parental  rights  to  his  youngest  child,  to  whom  he  is  a
committed and loving father, during his term of incarceration.
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court either reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate, or vacate his sentence and remand this case to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing.  Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order denying his
Rule 35 motion and remand this case to the district court with instructions to suspend his
sentence and place him on probation, or reduce the fixed portion of his sentence.
DATED this 2nd day of October, 2017.
___________/s/______________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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